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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the development of James I’s theory of divine right in England and how its application elevated the sovereignty
of the monarch to the extent of absolutism in the early seventeenth century. Since divine right ultimately conflicted with the ancient
laws and customs of the English government, James’s theory provoked newfound interpretations of the political and judicial
authority of the ruler. From a plethora of political treatises, religious sermons, and parliamentary records, these interpretations
ultimately affected how governmental institutions, such as Parliament and the courts, interacted with the monarchy.
Parliamentarians became more submissive to the king's will, the importance of constitutional law was diminished, and political
theories grew more in favor of divine right. As such, by the end of James’s reign, divine right was no longer a theory but rather a
political reality, a development which enabled the king to rule with absolute power, all at the expense of parliamentary autonomy,
constitutional supremacy, and individual liberty. Therefore, discourse over the true nature of monarchal government not only
became more prevalent, but divine right itself became significantly entrenched within the English monarchy. This development
altered the English political landscape entirely, inevitably leading the kingdom to civil war in the 1640s and a fervent resurgence
of divine right with the restoration of Charles II in 1660. Thus, this paper reveals that divine right during the reign of James I was
paramount towards the transformation of the monarchy in early modern England, for it created a myriad of unique and complex
understandings of rulership that would ultimately lead to the expansion of absolutism, civil conflict, and political unrest for the
remainder of the century.
At the turn of the seventeenth century, James
Stuart asserted the divine right of kings through the
publication of his books Basilikon Doron and the Trew Lawe
of Free Monarchies before he ascended to the English throne
in 1603. Unequivocal in his assertions, James argued that the
essence of monarchy was divine and supreme in power,
authority, and status. All subjects, whether clergymen,
nobles, or ordinary citizens, were subservient to his
sovereignty. The king claimed to be a little god over his
domain, and he articulated his understanding of the nature of
monarchy as such:
Kings are called Gods by the [prophetical] King
David, because they sit [upon] God his Throne
in the earth, and have the count of their
administration to give [unto] him… since [God]
that hath only the power to make him, hath the
[only] the power to [unmake] him; and ye [only]
to obey.2

James’s relatively centralized power in Scotland before the
Union of the Crowns might well have given him the rationale
for his theory of divine right and led him to believe it was
well founded. While he consolidated royal authority in
Scotland, James rejected the political theories of his
humanist tutors, namely George Buchanan and Andrew
Melville. Buchanan had argued that kings had been
appointed by their subjects, and Melville that the monarch
was “but God’s silly vassal.”3 These assertions were
extreme challenges to royal authority, which provoked
James to define a political theory of divine monarchal
sovereignty. This political position enabled the king, with
the support of the Church of Scotland, to effectively solidify
his royal authority and power within the extant Scottish
establishments.
James faced an entirely different situation with the
foreign institutions of England, which became increasingly
less receptive to any understanding of the king’s power as
divine right. After his accession in 1603, James struggled
constantly with Parliament and the courts to make his claims
to authority a genuine reflection of political reality. Some of
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his conflicts with Parliament were due to its conventional
objections to the king’s lavish personal expenditures, but the
king’s divine right theory provoked staunch resistance based
on the ancient traditions and institutions of the English. The
Church of England under Henry VIII and Elizabeth I had
asserted the religious authority of the monarch before the
reign of James I, but the theory of divine right expanded the
monarch’s authority to all aspects of government, not solely
religious affairs.4 As a result, the publication of James’s
works and his ideological conflicts with the English
government generated a complex period of rapid ideological
change, which continued throughout the English Civil Wars
and even after the Restoration. James’s concept of divine
right would influence the ideas of John Milton, Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and other notable political theorists
who debated the true purpose and form of government. Even
though James himself failed to completely overrule the
demands of the parliamentarians and the courts, divine right
itself significantly affected English political theory and the
monarch’s influence in government.
Discussions of divine right became prominent
during the English Civil Wars, as royalists and
parliamentarians fought furiously over monarchal authority,
but responses during James I’s reign laid the foundations for
these conflicts and affected English politics and laws.5 Each
response addressed James’s divine right claims by
discussing his power in relation to the establishments of
England, citing scriptures, medieval texts, and the king’s
own works to refute or endorse the absolute supremacy of
his political authority. The issue was especially complicated
because the monarch was the head of both the English
church and the state. Nevertheless, divine right asserted the
primacy of the king’s political authority with respect to the
law, which protected certain rights of English subjects and
the judicial authority of the courts from the absolute power
of the monarch. The Tudor monarchs had mostly ruled
within this reality, but James effectively negated all practices
to assert his sovereignty. His ensuing struggles with
Parliament and the courts incited discussion of divine right
itself, with proponents and opponents further complicating
the matter with their own beliefs and understandings of law
and religion.6
In recent decades, the true impact of James’s
divine right theory has been fiercely debated, with historians
either refuting or affirming that the king’s beliefs influenced
the understanding of the monarchy and English government
in the early seventeenth century. J.P. Sommerville claimed
that James’s predecessors had promoted variations of divine
sovereignty, rejecting the notion that most subjects would

have completely disregarded or opposed his divine right
theory.7 In contrast, S.J. Houston claimed that the king’s
beliefs were effectively inconsequential, for many
parliamentarians and other government officials still
passionately refuted James’s divine right theory by the end
of king’s reign.8 However, the fact that James faced
considerable opposition to his beliefs does not indicate that
his theory failed to provoke new viewpoints and perspectives
on the true nature of monarchy and government. In fact, the
extremism of the king’s political theory incited a myriad of
responses, each one attempting to interpret divine right with
respect to the English political landscape. This paper
examines how James’s theory of divine right brought him
into conflict with English customs and establishments after
his accession to the English throne, provoking newfound
interpretations of the political and judicial authority of the
ruler. Thus, the theory of divine right also provided greater
opportunities to discuss the true nature and ideal form of a
monarchal government in the following decades.
In the beginning of James’s reign in England, the
reception of divine right was generally supported due to the
potential benefits its application could provide to the various
Protestant sects. As “Defender of the Faith,” James was
directly entrusted with the religious affairs of the English
church through the grace of God, as claimed by Henry VIII
in the Articles of Religion. As a result, most English
Protestants eventually accepted James’s claim in order to
promote their own interests.
As James Doelman points out, the Puritans used
James’s book Basilikon Doron to petition the king for
greater church reformation.9 They all argued that James
alone had the authority to remove the popish practices still
remaining after Henry VIII’s break from Rome in 1534. His
claim to divine right could nullify the influence of the
“popish” Anglican bishops and officials, whom the Puritans
believed were too Catholic in their positions and rituals.
They also appreciated James’s Presbyterian upbringing in
Scotland, which was influenced by the humanist and
Calvinist teachings of the king’s tutors.10
Like the Puritans, the Anglicans too were initially
hopeful of James’s assertion of divine right, for his views in
Basilikon Doron promoted a reverent, traditional
understanding of a ruler’s religious responsibilities.11
Monarchs were to be sincere in their religious observations,
and they had to interpret scripture in a manner that did not
stray towards excessive piety.12 Skeptical of the Reform
Protestants, such as his Presbyterian tutors, James was also
more sympathetic towards the traditional structure of the
Church of England, making him the perfect ruler to preserve

4
Conrad Russell, ”Divine Right in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in Public Duty and Private Conscience in SeventeenthCentury England, eds. John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 119.
5 J.P. Sommerville, “James I and the Divine Right of Kings: English Politics and Continental Theory,” in The Mental World of
the Jacobean Court, ed. Linda Levy Peck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 70.
6
Russell, “Divine Right,” 102-4.
7
Sommerville, “James I and the Divine Right of Kings,” 66.
8
Houston, James I, 31-4.
9
James Doelman, “’A King of Thine Own Heart’: The English Reception of King James VI and I’s BASILIKON DORON,” in
The Seventeenth Century 9, no. 1 (1994), 4.
10
Houston, James I, 57.
11
Doelman, “”A King of Thine,’” 4.
12
Stuart, The Political Works, 14-5.

https://scholar.smu.edu/jour/vol7/iss2/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jour.7.2.3

2

Greenhaw: The Little God of England: The Divine Right of James I and the En

the religious rites of the Anglicans. He also enjoyed the
religious and political authority his position in the English
church provided him. Unlike in the Church of Scotland,
James’s religious supremacy was unquestionable in
England, and he did not have to spend years consolidating
his power against the Presbyterian bishops who plagued his
early reign in Scotland.13 Most Protestants in England
viewed James as an authoritative monarch capable of
supporting their beliefs through his divine religious
authority. By the time of his accession in 1603, no English
subject denied the king’s divine right theory. The new ruler
embodied a great potential for either religious reformation or
conservatism.
Furthermore, Parliament was not initially resistant
to James’s claims of divine right, primarily because they
misunderstood the true extent of the king’s proposed
authority. For example, many parliamentarians and
petitioners to the king cited Basilikon Doron from the
perspective of English law and custom, perhaps wrongly
assuming that James knew the political landscape of his
newly acquired kingdom.14 They also believed that James
was simply reinforcing the religious responsibilities and
authority given to him through his status of a ruler, claims
which were no different from his predecessors’ since Henry
VIII.15 The bulk of James’s ideas in Basilikon Doron and
Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies were supported by scriptural
citations, reinforcing the monarch’s religious obligations.
However, most of his claims were entirely susceptible to
interpretation, including assertions that were not particularly
religious:
And according to the fundamentall Lawes
already alledged, we daily see that in
Parliament… the laws are but craved by his
subiects, and only made by him at their rogation,
and with their advice.16
Any parliamentarian reading this could well have assumed
that James acknowledged, or at least suggested, a noticeable
degree of political independence and cooperation between
the monarchy and Parliament. Furthermore, the
parliamentarians interpreting his books viewed his claims
within the context of the political and religious organization
of the English government, not the more centralized one that
James had developed in Scotland three decades earlier. Thus,
when James spoke of his authority and sovereignty with
respect to the English government, parliamentarians
mistakenly believed that the king was emphasizing the
traditional understanding of the English monarchy, rather
than advocating for the application of absolute divine right.17

However, some subjects supported the more
extreme understanding of James’s divine right theory from
the beginning of the king’s reign in England, recognizing the
absolute supremacy of the monarch with respect to
Parliament and other institutions. Sir John Hayward, a
notable historian and member of Parliament during
Elizabeth I’s reign, wrote directly on divine right shortly
after James’s accession. Considering that Hayward was
incarcerated after his implication in Robert Devereux’s
treason plot in 1600, he probably created this work to seek
clemency or patronage.18 Nevertheless, the work itself was
a thorough and dense reflection about the divine right of
kings in relation to succession, and it more accurately
examined James’s theory than any other interpretation at the
time:
Parliaments in al places have bin erected by
kings… All nations very few excepted, do
consent in this form of government; first, to bee
under one prince; secondly, to accept him by
succession, according to propinquitie of bloud…
It is God only who seateth kings in their state; it
is he only who may remove them.19
Hayward also provided historical precedents for the
monarch’s supremacy in relation to other government
entities, claiming that Parliament and the law were initially
created by the ruler. Furthermore, he claimed that most
government institutions, with the exception of religious
establishments, were natural and manmade, undermining
their authority and autonomy in relation to the divine
monarch.20 These claims are nearly identical to James’s
own in his Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies, and although
Hayward was appealing to the king directly, his text
demonstrated a willingness by a member of Parliament to
forsake the traditional understanding of English politics in
favor of James’s concept of divine right. Most officials
would not have conceded such extreme theory, considering
its absolutism, but perhaps Hayward recognized the likely
personal benefits of endorsing it. If the king had managed to
turn his belief into political reality, Hayward might have
gained the king’s favor, essentially transforming him from a
relatively disgraced individual into an influential and trusted
politician. Politicians, clergymen, and courtiers could thus
use divine right as a method for increasing their prominence
and authority through royal patronage, rather than having to
deal with the machinations of Parliament or any other
institution. As a result, Hayward’s document demonstrates
how divine right theory, while it overlooked English law and
government, attracted individuals who sought greater
political influence and power. Divine right theory provided
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officials, especially those disgraced or relatively unknown, a
means to gain political prominence and authority over the
more longstanding and independent parliamentarians, who
ultimately took issue with this unforeseen development.
Despite the existence of documents supporting
James’s radical interpretation of divine right at the beginning
of his reign, such as Hayward’s, most of these were
congratulatory and flattering in nature. Treatises on divine
right were directly addressed to the king and written for the
author’s own benefit. Many were panegyrics, which
concentrated more on congratulating the king for his
accession than on thoroughly examining his radical political
theory. Such innocuous remarks likely show that
parliamentarians and Puritans thought they had little reason
for concern over these texts. These works primarily
contributed to the extravagant welcome James received in
England during his accession, as well as the neglect of the
implications of his Basilikon Doron.21 Therefore, with the
widespread misunderstanding of the king’s theory and the
excess of flattering works, the actual amount of texts
explicitly supporting James’s interpretation of divine right
was likely unanticipated by the parliamentarians and the
Puritans, who became thoroughly surprised by the king’s
authoritarian actions after his accession.22 Perhaps James
would recognize their initial reflections and responses to his
ideas as admiration of the king’s “wisdom” or even as
flattery. They doubtless hoped to curry favor with the
Scottish king in a foreign court. Nevertheless, the early
responses to James’s promotion of divine right by both the
Puritans and the parliamentarians underestimated its
significance as they attempted to interpret divine right in
ways that best suited their interests.
The Puritans’ interpretations on the theory became
much divided, primarily because they disagreed over
James’s handling of church affairs. This disagreement arose
through the Hampton Court Conference of 1604, in which
James refused to abolish Anglican bishops and to remove
certain “popish” ceremonies. The moderate Puritans
believed James had justly addressed their petitions and
respected his assertions. The radicals, who would become
extremely influential during the reign of Charles I and the
English Civil Wars, were more skeptical.23 Their doubts
were reinforced by the king’s proclamation of Canon 36,
which required all clergymen to concede to the king’s
religious authority. Sir Jacob Henry, one such radical and
opponent to the Anglican church, responded to James’s
assertion of divine right in a treatise addressed directly to the
king himself:
Finally our Adversaries will obiect, that by these
assertions and defences we detract from the

Kings authorities & power… We honor the King
as a man next vnto God, and inferior to God
only… We gladlie acknowledge that the King is,
& ought to be Supreme governor even in all
causes and over all persons Ecclesiasticall… But
he is not Author or Minister of any
Ecclessiastical
thing
or
Cōnstitution
whatsoever.24
Henry’s sentiments were similar to the Presbyterian beliefs
of Melville, who was one of the king’s tutors in Scotland.
Melville claimed that James’s supremacy allowed him to
oversee church affairs, not to control them entirely:
There is two Kings and two Kingdoms in
Scotland. There is Christ Jesus the King, and his
kingdom the Kirk [Church of Scotland], whose
subject James the Sixth is… whom Christ has
called and commanded to watch over his Kirk,
and govern his spiritual kingdom… which no
Christian King nor Prince should control and
discharge.25
Although Henry’s refutation was not as blunt or scathing as
Melville’s, he too noticed the greater conflict between
James’s divine right theory and the Puritan beliefs, which
were noticeably similar to those of the Presbyterians in
Scotland.26 The only difference was that the reform Church
of Scotland did not explicitly declare the religious hegemony
of the monarch as the Anglican Church asserted in the
Articles of Religion. Nevertheless, perhaps Henry’s
argument revealed an inherent conflict between James’s
divine right theory and the beliefs of the reform Protestants,
further elucidating the conflict and frustrations between
Puritans and the monarchy that characterized James’s later
reign.
Furthermore, the Puritan interpretations of the
king’s divine right conflicted largely due to how moderate
and radical followers viewed his divine supremacy.
Moderate Puritans undoubtedly revered James as head of the
Anglican church, and even though they might have
disagreed with him on certain aspects of divine right, they
still were bound by the Articles of Religion to respect his
decisions.27 They certainly still misconstrued divine right
and thought they could sway the king, but even if these
endeavors failed, they obeyed him nonetheless.28 However,
the radical Puritans, as Henry’s text suggests, were more
passionately argumentative and captious about James’s
divine right. They understood the divine right of the king as
the authority that permitted James to oversee church affairs,
not to decide or to create them.29 The radical Puritans likely
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purposely overlooked James’s claim in Basilikon Doron that
emphasized the monarch’s supreme authority in religious
matters:
Thinking it one of your fairest styles [as king],
to be called a louing nourish-father to the
Church, seeing all the Churches within your
dominions planted with good Pastors… the
doctrine and discipline preserued inpuritie,
according to Gods word.30
James clearly regarded the ruler’s authority as absolute and
supreme in dealing with religious matters, but the
dissatisfied Puritans could skillfully use the king’s own
words to promote their own interests.31 After all, James had
decided to preserve the Anglican bishops and the traditional
rites leftover from Henry VIII’s break with Rome, so
perhaps they believed the king should be limited in his
religious authority, which itself was established on the
principle of divine right. Therefore, by recognizing the
extreme interoperability of James’s theory, the radical
Puritans exemplified a key development in the debate of
divine right for the remainder of the king’s reign. James’s
divine right was to be refuted and supported not only through
the traditional understanding of English politics and religion,
but also through the misuse of his own works, a strategy
Parliament and the courts would use in their own struggles
against the king’s growing absolutism.
While the Puritans grew divisive and concerned
over James’s divine right, parliamentarians also began
interpreting James’s theory against him, defining divine
right as an authority incapable of being entirely supreme in
relation to preexisting laws and customs. This development
arose through the Parliament of 1604, only a few months
after the Hampton Court Conference, when the House of
Commons petitioned James to intervene in the election of Sir
Francis Goodwin, a parliamentarian declared outlaw by the
Court of Chancery.32 The House of Commons insisted that
Goodwin was unlawfully declared an outlaw, and they
petitioned the king to judge the case against the claims of the
Court of Chancery. Ambivalent about the case, James
proclaimed that he would decided the matter with
impartiality, and if the parliamentarians disliked his
decision, they were to remember that the House of Commons
“’derived all matters of privilege from him, and by his grant,
he expected they should not be turned against him.’”33 Not
expecting such an extreme assertion, the parliamentarians
fiercely responded by drafting the Form of Apology and
Satisfaction, a document which bluntly asserted
parliamentarian independence and autonomy against the
king’s sovereignty. Ironically, as Doelman mentions in his

study of Basilikon Doron, the parliamentarians intentionally
referred to James’s work to imply his ignorance of the
English political landscape, mockingly stating that his books
provided them a “strong and undoubted assurance” of his
misinformed understanding of the English government.34
They then plainly refuted his notion of divine right by
directly asserting the monarch’s political limitations with
respect to Parliament:
We know, and with great thankfulness to God
acknowledge, that he hath given us a King of
such understanding and wisdom as is rare to find
in any prince in the world. Howbeit, seeing no
human wisdom, how great soever, can pierce
into the particularities of the rights and customs
of people… The prerogatives of princes may
easily and do daily grow; the privileges of the
subject are for the most part at an everlasting
stand.35
No doubt some of this hostility was the result of anti-Scottish
sentiments or leftover bitterness from Elizabeth I’s own
rather authoritarian reign, but the document itself shows a
definitive understanding of James’s concept of divine
right.36 The authors directly acknowledged the king’s view
of monarchy as absolute and divine, only to refute this claim
as misinformed and inherently incompatible with the ancient
rights of the English subjects. They also thoroughly listed
their protections and liberties against the ruler’s authority,
citing established laws and precedents since the reign of
Henry III.37 Despite the document’s reasonable objections
and strong arguments against James’s claim of divine
absolute authority, it is unlikely that it was presented to the
king. The drafters of the document had clearly ridiculed
James to an extent dangerously interpretable as treason, and
they boldly refused to acknowledge any validity in his
arguments from Basilikon Doron or the Trew Lawe of Free
Monarchies.
The parliamentarians could more effectively serve
their interests by adapting their traditional beliefs to compete
with James’s unprecedented claim of divine right. They
could then better argue and articulate their ideas in
opposition the king without seeming disrespectful or
insolent. Thus, the parliamentarians invoked more
traditional and medieval understandings of the monarch’s
role within government, asserting that the ruler, despite
having divine right, was still required to follow extant laws
and customs. For example, Sir Edward Forset, a prominent
politician and writer since the reign of Elizabeth I,
incorporated a traditional view of monarchy into James’s
theory in 1606. This interpretation was published in his
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Comparative Discourse of the Bodies Natural and Politic, in
which he explained divine right in regards to the medieval
principal of dual-body monarchy, also known as the king’s
two bodies.
Dual-body theory of monarchy had been well
known by the time of Elizabeth I. According to Edmund
Plowden, one of the queen’s most prominent royal attorneys,
the ruler had two bodies: the body natural and the body
politic.38 The body natural dealt with the mortal body of the
ruler, which was similar to that of any other subject, and the
body politic was the literal embodiment of the kingdom,
including politics and religion. However, the monarch was
not supposed to rule absolutely as James asserted with divine
right, but rather through cooperation with Parliament and the
courts. Forset attempted to make this concept accord with
James’s beliefs:
The ruler should wholly indeuour the welfare of
his people, and the subiect ought… to comforme
vnto his soueraigne… [however] it was not in
the power of the body either to chuse or refuse
the soule, but his right of admission depended
only on the pleasure of his immediate maker..
that in this high point of principalitie [the
monarch], God hath reserued to himself this
prerogative of bestowing that diginitie.39
Forset acknowledged James’s divine right through his
appointment by God, but he claimed that the monarch still
had to serve for the welfare of his subjects in order to rule
legitimately. The subjects, including those in Parliament and
the courts, could also not prosper without the ruler, whose
appointment by God made him the sole authority in
overseeing the government.40 Therefore, according to
Forset, divine right was not necessarily an absolute
declaration of authority, but rather an innovation in the
theory of the king’s two bodies. Parliamentarians composed
the body politic of the king and owed fealty to him, but
James ultimately had sovereignty through God, which he
was required to use for the welfare of his subjects and his
kingdom. Forset appealed directly to parliamentarian
sentiments, but he neither dismissed nor contested the king’s
authority. He wholly acknowledged the divine sanctioning
of the monarch, and he conceded the king’s authority over
other governmental entities, so long as the ruler cooperated
with these institutions to serve the welfare of the state.41 As
a result, Forset’s work promoted a newfound political theory
that could reconcile the inherent differences between
James’s concept of divine right and the traditional beliefs of

the parliamentarians, who struggled to communicate their
understanding of English politics with respect to the king’s
theory.
Despite the parliamentarians’ attempts to interpret
and reconcile divine right through more traditional theories,
royalist support for the king’s absolute divine supremacy
increased significantly. They argued that James’s beliefs
were protected under the legal pretext of the royal
prerogative. This claim was proposed by the royalist jurist
John Cowell, who compiled his argument in an extremely
controversial law dictionary, The Interpreter, in 1607.
Seeking to promote James’s political authority and
undermine the parliamentarians, Cowell promoted divine
right through king’s royal prerogative, which, due to its
vague sense, James could use to justify any action against
the will of Parliament.42 Therefore, Cowell defined the royal
prerogative expansively:
Praerogative of the King is that especiall power,
preeminence, or priviledge that the King hath
above other persons, and above the ordinarie
course of the common lawe, in right of his
crowne… all that absolute heighth of power that
the Civilians call… subject only to god.43
According to Cowell, the royal prerogative, the legal
definition of the monarch’s power, was divine right itself,
which no subject, government entity, or legal institution
could refute. His definition even undermined Parliament,
stating that the “king was above the Parlement” as well as
the “positive lawes of his kingdom.”44 Furthermore, Cowell
acknowledged the king’s sovereignty as supreme over the
law. This development was significant, because unlike
Hayward’s earlier interpretation, which addressed the king’s
authority with respect to Parliament and the Church of
England, Cowell’s understanding of divine right provided
James legitimate judicial authority. If The Interpreter had
become a prominent law dictionary used to define legal
principles throughout the kingdom, James could have
swiftly turned his theory of divine right into reality.
Parliamentarians relied significantly on English law to
protect their traditional rights, as they expressed thoroughly
in the Form of Apology and Satisfaction. If legal definitions
of these liberties were so weakened to strengthen the
monarch’s prerogative, their rights would have been
effectively nullified. Nevertheless, Cowell’s The Interpreter
would never become the bastion of divine right as the jurist
had hoped, nor would it become a standard in the
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interpretation of English law.45 However, Cowell’s work
introduced a new legal interpretation of divine right that
would come to the forefront of debates about it, forcing
James into greater legal, political, and religious conflicts
than those he faced at the beginning of his reign.
After the publication of Cowell’s The Interpreter,
jurists, fearing James growing legal and political authority,
began to change their understandings of divine right to refute
the theory entirely, rather than attempting to reconcile it with
the extant customs of the English government. However,
they still acknowledged the necessity of refuting James’s
theory through more diplomatic and considerable terms,
rather than the more backhanded, insulting approach the
drafters of the Form of Apology and Satisfaction had used in
1604. The greatest example of this development was the
Case of Prohibitions of 1607, in which Sir Edward Coke,
then Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, wittily
refuted James’s divine right and prerogative as inferior to
English law. The case arose through Richard Bancroft, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, who argued that the king’s divine
right enabled him to intervene in any legal case that might
conflict with his interests.46 He defined the king’s judicial
authority as “clear in Divinity that such Authority [belonged]
to the King by the Word of God in the Scripture,” providing
James the authority to intervene in the courts whenever he
deemed necessary.47 With this support, the king then
decided to intervene in a land dispute sent to the Court of
Common Pleas, although it remains unclear why he did so.48
Perhaps he wanted to test the court’s reaction to his
intervention and test whether the justices would protest
against Bancroft’s understanding of divine right.
Nevertheless, the reaction James received was far from
supportive. Coke responded by explaining his interpretation
of common law to James in conference, arguing the authority
of the law against the king’s divine right and prerogative:
A controversy of Land between parties was
heard by the King, and sentence given, which
was repealed for this, that did belong to the
Common Law… God had endowed his Majesty
with excellent Science, and great endowments
of nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the
Lawes of his Realm of England… they are not
decided to be decided by naturall reason but by
the artificiall reason and judgment of Law.49
Coke, much like the drafters of the Form of Apology and
Satisfaction, refuted the king’s divine authority based on the
king’s failure to understand English law. However, Coke did

not reject James political authority, as the parliamentarians
had done in defense of their own rights, but rather subsumed
it under the law. Divine right gave the king supremacy in
political and religious matters, but because the law was
created through the courts and Parliament, he did not have
the “artificial reason” that allowed him to make court
decisions. By stating that the law was artificial and not
divine, Coke skillfully countered James’s argument that the
monarch was a supreme judge through his divine right. The
Chief Justice argued that the king’s divine right was
insufficient to deal with the complex, manmade workings of
the law, thus invalidating the claims of James and his
supporters.
Although Coke primarily defended English law,
the parliamentarians were quick to use his interpretation to
bolster their own arguments against the king’s supremacy.
By 1610, Parliament, growing deeply concerned by James’s
authoritarian behavior and the lingering existence of the The
Interpreter, resisted helping James with his financial
struggles. The parliamentarians, now clearly aware of how
capacious divine right theory could be, effectively forced
James to suppress the publication of Cowell’s dictionary;
they refused to grant him his annual income unless he
agreed. They reinforced their threat with another
proclamation of their rights and liberties. Unlike the
assemblies in previous years, the parliamentarians were
conscious of James’s infringements on their rights. He had
intervened in Parliament, disrupted court proceedings, and
ignored English customs all under the pretext of divine right.
Furthermore, he applied divine right itself more frequently
over the course of his reign. Royalists, such as Cowell and
Hayward, also actively used the theory to change the
fundamental understandings of the English government. As
a result, Parliament more actively contested the king over
nearly every government affair, becoming significantly
more reluctant to fund James’s expenditures as his reign
progress. With Parliament’s offensive actions and Coke’s
firm control over the English law, hostile reactions to divine
right became more prominent.50
As the second decade of the king’s reign in
England approached, Parliament’s hostile reactions to
James’s theory of divine right were displayed through both
proclamations and financial restraints, limiting the king’s
policymaking and extravagances and isolating his
supporters. In the Parliament of 1610, the restless
parliamentarians argued fiercely with James over his
understanding of the monarch’s prerogative, restating their
grievances and the arguments they had made in the Form of
Apology and Satisfaction six years earlier.51 These
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complaints were then followed by a series of debates and
speeches, in which the parliamentarians began to reinforce
the importance of their rights and undermine the king’s
authority by rejecting his encroachments and monetary
demands.52 One parliamentarian was Sir Thomas Hedley,
who claimed that the law and the king were dependent solely
upon Parliament:

Equally as irritated with the parliamentarians as
they were with him, James responded to their protests and
financial prohibitions with a speech of his own, a speech
which would reassert the king’s political authority and
undermine his critics. Remaining true to his sentiments and
continuing to advocate for divine right, James told
Parliament:

The judges nor the king himself without the
parliament could never have made them
[statutes] laws… But then you will say, the
parliament, which is nothing else in effect but
the mutual consent of the king and people, is that
which gives matter and form… to the common
law. No… the parliament hath his power and
authority from the common law, and not the
common law from the parliament… the
common law doth bind, and lead or direct the
right of the crown.53

The State of MONARCHIE is the supremest
thing vpon earth: For Kings are not onely Gods
Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon GODS
throne, but even by GOD himselfe they are
called Gods…for that they exercise a manner or
resemblance of Divine power vpon earth.56

Hedley’s argument was that Parliament manifested the law
itself, which in turn provided authority to the courts and the
king. Since James’s application of divine right was chiefly
dependent on the royal prerogative, which itself was
bounded to English law, his power thus depended upon the
will of Parliament. Hedley then stated that this
understanding was accepted by “all the King’s learned
counsel,” who by unequivocally supporting James’s divine
right, were effectively committing sedition against the
principles of the English government.54 Any official
agreeing to uphold the sanctity and integrity of the English
law could not, by the virtue of their position, support an
ideology or theory that inherently conflict withed the ancient
customs of the kingdom. Therefore, Hedley undermined not
only James’s authority and the claims of the royalist jurists,
but also the members of Parliament seeking to gain power
and prominence through the king’s favor. Divine right was
becoming less of a matter of debate and interpretation and
more of a conflict with increasingly polarized viewpoints,
with each side of the argument willing to take more drastic
proclamations and measures. Hedley’s speech demonstrated
this development by isolating supporters of James’s theory
and advocating for the limitation of the ruler’s authority,
asserting that the king had no supremacy over Parliament
through the law, which he contested in order to increase his
prerogative.55 For the parliamentarians, James’s theory of
divine right became intolerable, and considering Hedley’s
examination of the monarch’s role in government, the
frustration with the king’s theory definitively reached its
apex. Unfortunately for the parliamentarians, James was
thoroughly prepared to defend his divine right as king.

In distinction to his views in Basilikon Doron or the Trew
Lawe of Free Monarchies, the king appealed to a sense of
English identity to reinforce his claim. He stated that the
ancient English institutions existed to help him govern with
divine right:
For after I had told as a Divine, what was due by
the Subiects to their Kings in general, I would
then have concluded as an Englishman, shewing
this people, That as in generall all Subiects were
bound to relieve their King… as we lived in a
settled state of a Kingdom which was gouerned
by his owne fundamentall Lawes and Orders…
to consider how to helpe such a King as now
they had.57
By appealing to Parliament as an Englishmen and
expressing his willingness to cooperate with the English
government, James ultimately undermined his critics, who
used any means necessary to resist his executive decisions
and assert their autonomy.58 Fortunately for the king, his
appeal worked. In a letter from Sir John More to Sir Ralph
Winwood, two parliamentarians present during James’s
speech, More described the reception of the address as a
“Great Contentment of all Parties.”59 He also admired the
ending of James’s speech, which he recalled as “the
Soveraignty of Kings was absolute in generall, yet in
particular the Kings of England were restrained by their
Oath and the Privileges of the People.”60 This conclusion
was likely another misunderstanding of James’s intentions
and political theory. Most of James’s reasoning was from
was taken directly from his own Trew Lawe of Free
Monarchies, which claimed a just ruler should consider and
assess laws, not be restrained by them.61 The king would
make this understanding clearer in his future unsuccessful
struggles with Parliament later in his reign, but the
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immediate effect of James’s speech was a resounding
success. The parliamentarians considered James a more
considerate and knowledgeable king than they initially
believed, and perhaps they feared his true capabilities as a
ruler more than ever. One conclusion from this event was
clear. After the king’s lofty and masterful speech, James and
his supporters were certain to fight more fiercely for divine
right and become more aggressive towards their opponents.
In the years immediately following the Parliament
of 1610, divine right became an ideology imposed on almost
every English institution, including the courts and
Parliament. They struggled to resist the king’s influence as
his followers became more abundant. By 1614, James’s
support had increased so significantly since his accession
that Parliament was effectively in gridlock, thus giving that
year’s assembly the notorious name the “Addled
Parliament,” in which not a single bill or piece of legislation
was passed. The more traditional parliamentarians, still
vying for political autonomy in opposition to James’s divine
right proponents, refused to give James any amount of
support for his continued financial struggles, going so far as
to even threaten to remove impositions from his prerogative.
Impositions were a right given to the king to impose taxes
on imported goods, which although were beneficial to
James’s royal income, were obviously detrimental to the
incomes of parliamentarians whose interests involved trade
with continental Europe. Not willing to relinquish this right,
Parliament halted its proceedings until James grew impatient
and dissolved it entirely. He then began arresting prominent
parliamentarians under the justification of their insolence
and decided to rule without any assembly for the remainder
of the decade.62 Although he no longer received any
financial aid from Parliament or could pass any legislation
without the assembly, this development, nonetheless,
temporarily benefitted divine right. Without parliamentarian
proclamations against the theory, James was able to more
freely establish divine right within the framework of the
English church and government.63 The king chose to rule
without Parliament and its consent, even if that meant losing
a large sum of his royal income. The main protestations
against divine right were subsequently formulated through
the king’s conflicts with the courts.
Even though James now could implement divine
right without the interference of Parliament, he still faced
issues with jurists interpreting his theory with respect to
English law. Coke, who was moved from the Court of
Common Pleas to the Court of the King’s Bench in 1613,
still resisted the king’s attempts to intervene in the judiciary
process.64 Remaining faithful to his understanding of

English law, Coke refused the king’s use of the royal
prerogative in the Commendams Case of 1616, in which the
Court of the King’s Bench debated the right of the king to
order commendams, or temporary ecclesiastical offices.65
James, as head of the Church of England, granted the Bishop
of Coventry and Lichfield permission to continue his
position in commendam.66 Unsure about the legality of the
king’s issuance of commendams through the royal
prerogative, Coke and the other justices debated the matter
without James’s presence, who after learning this, demanded
that they halt the investigation in a letter sent by Sir Francis
Bacon.67 Coke refused to delay the case due to the justices’
oaths, which prohibited the justices from any delays in court
proceedings. Even though the case concerned the
prerogative of the king, and the king’s command was issued
through his prerogative as well, Coke, along with the other
justices, believed his oath to the law overruled James
authority:
your Majesty’s Judges, upon their oaths, and
according to their best knowledge and learinge,
are bounde to deliver the true underaundinge
faithfully and uprightly. And the case is between
subjects for private interrest and inheritaunce,
earnestly called on for just and expedition [by
Bacon’s letter]. Wee holde it our duties to
informe your Majestie that our oathe is in theis
express words: That in case anie letters come
unto us contrary to lawe, that wee doe nothinge
by such letters, but certefie your Majestie
thereof, and goe forth to doe the lawe.68
Coke’s reaction was not surprising, considering the last
twenty years of his judicial career were characterized by
efforts to subvert the king’s prerogative and contest divine
right theory. Nevertheless, the justices’ reactions to James’s
rebuttal were very interesting. After James refuted Coke’s
response in a fierce address to the Court of the King’s Bench,
each justice, except Coke, submitted to his authority,
completely disregarding their oaths and pleading for the
king’s forgiveness.69 They did not assert the authority of the
law over the king’s prerogative, as Coke did, nor did they
even attempt to defend the law at all. A reasonable
explanation for their rather cowardly reactions is that
James’s divine right was becoming a reality within the
English government, at least to the degree that his authority
felt more powerful than the protection of the law. If the
justices truly believed the law was supreme over the king’s
prerogative and divine right, then they would have supported
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Coke’s defense, in which he claimed that he would simply
judge each case fairly, regardless of James’s demands.70
Despite the strong defense of the law that Coke and the
courts advanced against the king’s application of divine right
at the beginning of his reign, the judicial fortifications were
finally weakening. By 1616, James apparently could
threaten and force his opponents into submission with his
mere presence, as the Commendams Case clearly
demonstrated. Much like with the parliamentarians, James
finally gained authority over the very courts that caused him
so many struggles earlier, exhaustingly imposing his theory
on the jurists until they had essentially little to no defense
against his sovereignty. Divine right was no longer a simple
debated political theory, but rather an integral aspect of the
monarchy itself.
In addition to James directly and forcefully
implementing divine right by dissolving Parliament and
threatening the courts, this development was greatly
supported by Anglican preachers, whose interpretations of
the theory expanded the king’s authority over the other
institutions. For example, in a sermon at Paul’s Cross in
1614, John Rawlinson, an Anglican preacher, fully
supported divine right and undermined the authority of the
courts. He asserted that the king’s appointment by God gave
him the sole authority to interpret the law and govern justly:
the Law is the worke of the Prince; the Prince is
the image of GOD digesting and ordering all
things… a Prince is then indeed the Image of
God, when carefull to make good Lawes, & no
lesse careful to execute them, that his people
liuing vnder him in security and safety, may
have iust cause to pray for his safety.71
However, Rawlinson was not advocating absolutism, as he
claimed that a “king in his absolute and [unlimited] power is
able to do more than a good King will [do].”72 Instead, the
monarch was the interpreter and defender of the law.
Because the law was derived from the works of monarchs,
they alone had the ability to understand it. This position
directly refuted Coke’s earlier statements in the Case of
Prohibitions in 1607, which argued that the monarch’s
natural reason was insufficient to govern in conformity with
artificial laws.73 Although Rawlinson did not necessarily
agree with the complete absolutism implicit in claims to
divine right, he did support James’s arguments about the
ruler being the sole interpreter of the law and having to rule
with fair judgment:
a good King, although hee be aboue the Law,
will subiect and frame his actions thereto, for

examples sake to his subiects, and of his owne
free-will, but not as subiect or bound thereto.74
Therefore, the ruler was the ultimate authority with respect
to interpreting the law, over the courts and Parliament, who
deemed that James was incapable of understanding it.
Rawlinson countered the institutions that asserted the
James’s ineptitude by reversing their own argument. He
claimed that the law derived from monarchs with divine
appointment. The law was thus incomprehensible to
individuals with artificial reasoning. Through Rawlinson’s
interpretation of divine right, James now had a valid counter
to the arguments of his inability to understand the law that
the courts and Parliament had leveled against him for so
many years. His supporters would use variations of this
reasoning to further promote and expand upon divine right.
For example, expanding upon Rawlinson’s
argument, Williamson Dickinson, an Anglican preacher at
Oxford in 1619, argued that the king’s divine right made him
the supreme judge of any law or matter, regardless of any
preexisting custom or institution. However, unlike
Rawlinson, Dickinson believed that the monarch’s judgment
and will was absolute, arguing that the ruler could set any
law they deemed appropriate:
But to be The Iudge, is to be that Maiesty and
Architectonicall power, which out of its owne
absolutenes setteth downe a Law, and
appointeth a publike measure… to be an
absolute Prince and Lord ouer them, and to order
and dispose of things so… which shew that he
was not onely to haue Iurisdictionem
[Jurisdiction], but Dominium [Dominion] ouer
their persons and estates.75
The reason for Dickinson’s emphasis on the ruler’s role as a
supreme judge was obviously to reinforce James’s judicial
authority with respect to the courts’, but his understanding
of divine right was much more extreme than that of
Rawlinson’s in 1614. The explanation for the difference
between these interpretations of divine right is that by 1619,
James faced little direct opposition against his theory.
Parliament had been dissolved for five years by the time of
Dickinson’s sermon, and with Coke’s removal from the
Court of the King’s Bench in 1616, the courts had little
incentive to go against James’s wishes.76 The only
significant protestations against the king’s sovereignty that
remained were those of the radical Puritans, but even their
complaints were overshadowed by the majority of content
Anglican churchgoers.77 Therefore, Dickinson’s extremism
demonstrated the growing support for the absolutist
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interpretation of divine right that James’s had expressed in
his works, rather than the more adaptive understandings
which arose earlier in the king’s reign. Despite Dickinson’s
sermon more strongly asserting divine right than evaluating
it as a political theory, his sentiments became prominent
amongst theorists and politicians toward the end of James’s
reign.
By 1621, James’s divine right was more supported
and discussed than at any other period of his rule in England.
Although the king had severed any chance of working with
Parliament again, his theory was essentially inseparable
from the understanding of monarchy in England. Since
divine right, now with de facto absolutism, was an apparent
aspect of the English monarchy, the parliamentarian
viewpoint of the monarchy itself began to shift towards fear
and hatred, an outlook which would later spark the
bloodshed of the English Civil Wars nearly two decades
later.78 In contrast, royalists and supporters of the king
appeared to write more about divine right than in the
previous years of James’s reign, with many theorists
supporting the absolutism of divine right rather than trying
to adapt it with medieval or traditional political concepts.
Some theorists even changed their viewpoints entirely,
shifting from their original interpretations to staunchly
supporting the king’s divine sovereignty. The most
compelling explanation for this development was that the
outbreak of the Thirty-Years War in 1618 compelled
theorists to assert the religious and political authority of
Protestant rulers over Catholic monarchs and Rome. Thus,
many documents emphasized James’s supremacy with
respect to the Papacy in both religious and civil affairs.79
Theorists may have primarily supported James’s theory to
reinforce the monarch’s supremacy over Rome, but they do
not state that the monarch was below the law or any civil
institution either. Since divine right was already becoming
more associated with the monarchy and because antiCatholic sentiment in England was at its apex, James’s
divine right was perhaps more widely accepted in this
increasingly chaotic and tense political atmosphere.
A clear example of the growing argumentation in
favor of absolute divine right is a political treatise by
Thomas Proctor, an English writer, who in 1621 defined the
monarch as supreme over all subjects and institutions,
including religious and civil institutions. Even though his
argument concentrated on the king’s supremacy over Rome,
Proctor believed that the monarch’s authority was supreme
in every matter, not just religious affairs. He argued this
claim by stating that monarchs were judges appointed by
God, like Dickinson’s argument, and that the judgment of
the king was above all else:
Princes of whom our Lord testifies (as before I
have shewen) that they are called Gods, are also
Iudges; therefore the word given to them, is

given to them as Iudges… Princes are not barely
as executioners, to reward the good, and punish
evill doers, but they are constituted also Iudges
by the Lord, that they also may iudge in all
things, to which the word already reveal from
God, stretcheth.80
As the quote reveals, Proctor also appealed to James’s belief
that monarchs were effectively smaller forms of God, who
were appointed by him to “rule over other men.”81 This
connection is significant because Proctor argued from
James’s works, not by invoking the framework of the
English government or some traditional theory of monarchy.
Proctor wholeheartedly endorsed the monarch’s religious
and political authority through the very sentiments James
expressed throughout his entire reign in England. He made
no effort to even acknowledge any other authority than that
of the king. Furthermore, Proctor’s arguments were almost
as blunt as Cowell’s and Hayward’s in James’s early reign,
but his treatise was published in 1621 with apparently no
record of controversy or censorship. Proctor’s treatise thus
provides a clear indication that divine right was becoming
more accepted in the later period of James’s reign, even
though Proctor’s anti-Catholicism no doubt contributed
towards his endorsement of the king’s theory. The religious
turmoil and conflict in continental Europe compelled many
English subjects to accept divine right in a time when antiCatholic prejudice was at its highest in English society.82
Nevertheless, the primary significance of Proctor’s treatise
is that the authority of the monarch was emphasized above
all religious and civil institutions. Even though this emphasis
was highly controversial throughout the majority of James’s
reign, it was likely undisputed by the time of this work’s
publication.
Thus, although James had struggled with
Parliament, the courts, and the Puritans for nearly the
entirety of his reign in England, his theory of divine right in
the kingdom was a sort of Pyrrhic victory, in which the
support for his theory became more prevalent, but so did the
views of those who opposed it. The trust between Parliament
and the monarchy was effectively destroyed, and many of
the king’s opponents, such as Coke, would spend the
remainder of their lives opposing James’s son, Charles I,
after the king’s death in 1625.83 Although James was also
able to impose his application of divine right by dissolving
Parliament and removing opposition in the courts, his
actions created bitterness and hatred towards the monarchy
among parliamentarians that would culminate in the English
Civil Wars in 1642. These parliamentarians were also joined
by the radical Puritans, who felt betrayed by James’s refusals
to remove rites and traditions within the Church of England
that they deemed popish. All of these parties vehemently
opposed divine right because of James drastic actions to
impose it upon the English government, which inarguably
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led to more negative consequences than benefits for the
monarchy.
However, despite James’s failure to completely
apply his theory within the English political landscape,
divine right undoubtedly changed political theory and
discourse about the English monarchy for the remainder of
the century. James radical theory of divine right was
completely incompatible with the extant institutions of the
English government. Despite this inherent incompatibility,
political theorists, parliamentarians, jurists, and clergymen
all attempted to interpret and understand divine right through
their own beliefs and understandings of the English
government. Some individuals tried adapting divine right to
medieval theories and traditional concepts, while others
wholeheartedly accepted the extremism of James’s views.
Although James’s actions greatly polarized his subjects into
two politically separated factions, divine right did become a
significant political theory, with which most government
officials had to grapple at some point or another. This paper
demonstrates that James’s theory of divine right greatly
changed how the English perceived the monarchy with
respect to other governmental institutions, especially
Parliament and the courts. Although the king did face
considerable opposition to his beliefs, the impact of divine
right theory was definitely not insignificant or negligible
towards the development of the English political landscape
in the early seventeenth century. The significance of divine
right during the reign of James I was that it provoked
newfound interpretations of the political and judicial
authority of the ruler, a development which would
subsequently provide greater opportunities to discuss the
true nature of monarchy and government in the decades
following the king’s accession.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge and give my sincerest
gratitude to Dr. Kathleen Wellman, whose expertise,
guidance, and support were crucial to this paper’s
completion. She is also a great mentor and professor, and I
hope to one day teach by her example with my own students
in the future. I would also like to thank my committee
members, Dr. Melissa Dowling and Dr. Macabe Keliher, for
their insights and comments during my defense. They have
also been seminal towards my professional development as
a historian, and, if I may, as an individual. Lastly, I would
like to thank the Department of History at Southern
Methodist University for giving me the opportunity to
become a historian. It has been one of the greatest
experiences of my life, and I will continue to use the
knowledge and skills the department has taught me in my
own professional career.

REFERENCES
[1] Ashton, Robert, ed. James I by his Contemporaries.
London: Hutchinson of London, 1969.
[2] Coke, Edward. The Selected Writings and Speeches of
Sir Edward Coke. Edited by Steve Sheppard,
Steve. 3 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003.

https://scholar.smu.edu/jour/vol7/iss2/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jour.7.2.3

[3] Cowell, John. The Interpreter: Or Booke Containing the
Signification of Words. Cambridge: John Legate,
1607; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership,
2011. Accessed through Early English Books at
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A19476.0001.001 on
December 1, 2020.
[4] Dickinson, William. The King’s Right Briefly Set Downe
in a Sermon. London: Thomas Purfoot, 1619.
Accessed
through
ProQuest
at
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2240897738/
on October 12, 2020.
[5] Forset, Edward. A Comparative Discourse of the Bodies
Natural and Politique. London: Eliot’s Court
Press, 1606. Accessed through ProQuest at
https://www.proquest.com/
docview/2240880500/.
[6] Foster, Elizabeth, ed. Proceedings in Parliament 1610.
Vol 2. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1966.
[7] Hayward, John. An Answer to the First Part of a Certaine
Conference Concerning Succession. London:
Thomas Chard, 1603. Accessed through ProQuest
at
https://www
.proquest.com/docview/2240894559/ on October
12, 2020.
[8] Henry, Jacob. Reasons Taken out of Gods Word and the
Best Humane Testimonies. Middleburg: Richard
Schilders, 1604. Accessed through ProQuest at
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2240897142/
on October 12, 2020.
[9] Plowden, Edmund. The Commentaries or Reports of
Edmund Plowden. Dublin: H. Watts and W. Jones,
1792. Accessed through Hathi Trust at
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008928713
on November 25, 2020.
[10] Procter, Thomas. The Right of Kings Conteyning a
Defense of their Supremacy. 1620. Accessed
through
ProQuest
at
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2240950115/
on October 12, 2020.
[11] Rawlinson, John. Vivat Rex, or A Sermon Preached at
Paul’s Cross. Oxford: John Lichfield and James
Short, 1619. Accessed through ProQuest at
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2248554563/
on October 12, 2020.
[12] Stuart, James I. The Political Works of James I. Edited
by Charles H. McIlwain. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1918.
[13] Tanner, J.R., ed. Constitutional Documents of the Reign
of James I, A.D. 1603-1625. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960.

12

Greenhaw: The Little God of England: The Divine Right of James I and the En

[14] Doelman, James. “’A King of Thine Own Heart’: The
English Reception of King James VI and I’s
BASILIKON DORON.” In The Seventeenth
Century 9, no. 1 (1994): 1-9.
[15] Fortier, Mark. “Equity and Ideas: Coke, Ellesmere, and
James I.” In Renaissance Quarterly 51, no. 4
(1998): 1255-1281. Accessed through JSTOR at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2901967
on
November 15, 2020.
[16] Hexter, J.H. "Power Struggle, Parliament, and Liberty
in Early Stuart England." In The Journal of
Modern History 50, no. 1 (2020): 2-50. Accessed
through
JSTOR
at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878705
on
November 24, 2020.

edited by Linda Levy Peck.
Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Cambridge:

[25] Walter, P.B. “The Struggle of Prerogative and Common
Law in the Reign of James I.” In The Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science /
Revue Canadienne D’Economique Et De Politique
25, no. 2 (2020): 144-152. Accessed through
JSTOR at https://www.jstor.org/stable/139057 on
November 25, 2020.
[26] Womersley, David. “Sir John Harward's Tacitism.” In
Renaissance Studies 6, no. 1 (1992): 46-59.
Accessed
through
JSTOR
at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24412406 on October
12, 2020.

[17] Houston, S.J. James I. New York: Longman Publishing,
1995.
[18] Hulme, D. and S. Peté. “Vox Populi? Vox Humbug! rising tension between the South African
executive and judiciary considered in historical
context - part one.” In PER: Potchefstroomse
Elektroniese Regsblad 15, no. 5 (2012): 44-47.
Accessed through SciELO at http://www
.scielo.org.za/ on November 26, 2020.
[19] Kerrigan, John. “The Political and Religious Thought
of James I.” In Master’s Theses 2468 (1970): 1140. Accessed through Loyola University Chicago
at https:ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2486 on
November 28, 2020.
[20] Lindquist, Eric N. “The Case of Sir Francis Goodwin.”
In The English Historical Review 104, no. 313
(1989): 670-677. Accessed through JSTOR at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/570380 on October
12, 2020.
[21] Müßig, Ulrike. “Coke’s ‘Tales’ about Sovereignty” in
Journal of Constitutional History 1, no. 34 (2017):
19-56. Accessed through Gale Academic OneFile
at https://go.gale.com/ on November 26, 2020.
[22] Russell, Conrad. “Divine Right in the Early Seventeenth
Century.” In Public Duty and Private Conscience
in Seventeenth-Century England, edited by John
Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973.
[23] Simon, Jocelyn. “Dr. Cowell.” In The Cambridge Law
Journal 26, no. 2 (1968): 260-272. Accessed
through
JSTOR
at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4505244 on October
12, 2020.
[24] Sommerville, J.P. “James I and the Divine Right of
Kings: English Politics and Continental Theory.”
In The Mental World of the Jacobean Court,

Published by SMU Scholar, 2022

13

